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This paper examines the process of democratic emergence and consolidation. We claim that 
balance in structure, organization, and discourse are crucial. A comparison of transition strategies, 
civil society, and regime type shows that negotiated change and parliamentary systems are more 
conducive to democracy than power disruption and presidential regimes. 
While the promise of democracy echoed amidst 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the USSR, a dec­
ade of social experimentation later democracy's 
record is mixed: ascendant in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, nonexistent in Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
uncertain in Ukraine and Russia. Alongside questions 
of democratization are issues of economic change, 
identity and ethnicity, and state capacity. While a 
total theory on this «quadruple transition» (democ­
ratization, market-building, state-building, nation-
building) [1] is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
suggest outlines for a framework on the process of 
change. Here we examine democratization, but the 
logic applies elsewhere [2; 3] and merges unique­
nesses and generalizablity. (We define democracy as 
a polity of political decision-making through repre­
sentatives selected via contested elections, where the 
cost of participation is not restrictively high. Democ­
racy entails turnover and is consolidated when in­
cumbents lose and turn over power). 
A popular approach among research on democ­
racy is «pluralism,» where democracy involves poli­
tical participation reinforced by values [4; 5]. In plu­
ralism, democracy emerges and survives because of 
popular (middle-class) pressure for proto-democratic 
values — deferred gratification, meritocracy, univer-
salism, respect for law. In one variation of this theo­
ry, democracy is linked to elites' cost-benefit calcu­
lations. Democracy emerges when elites gain by leav­
ing authoritarian rule [6] and collapses if its costs are 
too great [7]. Democracy's inherent uncertainties may 
lead certain actors (e.g. officers, bourgeoisie) to aban­
don democracy for law and order. Democracy can fall 
if the costs of losing an election — greater in a presi­
dential than parliamentary system [8] — are great. 
Unfortunately, this approach does not address 
organized power and democracy. Democracy is as­
sumed emerge from values that automatically shape 
political structure and procedure. Fortunately, an al­
ternative approach, «managerialism» [9], analyzes 
democracy through a balance of power between or-
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ganized social groups (e.g. aristocrats, segments of 
the capitalist class, the state, trade unions, parties, 
etc.). For Barrington Moore [10], democracy emer­
ged when an alliance between aristocracy and bour­
geoisie balanced the state (e.g. in England). Where 
the bourgeoisie was weak (Russia) or subordinate to 
the state (Germany), democracy emerged with con­
genital weaknesses facilitating its demise. For Char­
les Tilly [11], democracy emerges from war. In wars, 
states require resources from society; a society with 
developed classes can demand political rights in re­
turn for finance. Democracy developed in England 
because merchants and aristocrats forced the Crown 
to create Parliament as an oversight commission to 
control the Crown's use of taxes. Democracy is en­
hanced by balance and competition between elite 
factions that provides citizens a choice of elites [12]. 
Democracy, thus, is not guaranteed by rales and val­
ues but by balance between competing groups with 
interests divergent enough to avoid unification 
against democracy. Democracy can crash when so­
cial power goes into disbalance, e.g. by war, emer­
gence of new mobilized forces, or shocks that dis­
rupt social organization. 
Not that values — or more broadly, «culture» — 
should be thrown out. There are potential strengths 
if insights from combining power and culture. Cross-
national research from Europe and Latin America 
supports managerialism [13]. Yet to begin and end 
with calculation and power is reductionist; democ­
racy is also an idea reverberating in political dis­
course and organization, constraining some actors 
(e.g. the state) and empowering others (e.g. working 
classes) to act within the limits not only of power but 
also of legitimacy. Working democracies persist not 
only because of elite balance but because elites view 
democracy as the only legitimate game in town [14]. 
In historical moments, to speak against democracy 
may be anathema. (This logic focuses less on «va­
lues» than structured discourse and claims, avoiding 
the thorny issues of just what «democratic» values 
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are and their link to structural changes.) Following 
the logic of these approaches (and general insights 
of political sociology), we can think of the political 
realm as constituted by structure (relations of actors 
to sources of power and to each other), institutions 
(procedures, categories, and logics of organization), 
organization (specific relations and procedures of 
concrete groups of agents), and discourse (articulat­
ed categories, meanings, and the logics linking 
them). This allows us to suggest the following ar­
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Note that the key is balance: balance between or­
ganizations; structural relations providing and reprodu­
cing balance; institutions that maintain balance, 
empowering and constraining political actors; and dis­
course legitimating both that balance and the right of 
political openness and participation above all else. This 
suggests that the emergence of democracy involves 
strategies of political and non-political elites as well as 
broader culture, but that these are embedded in lega­
cies of both institutions and structures of power. To 
follow Skocpol's dictum on revolutions [15], democ­
racy is not made, it comes — accidentally. 
One problem, however, limits the utility of ap­
plying developed insights on democracy to post-so­
cialist systems: these theories grew out of studies of 
historical cases that already had some form of capi­
talism providing the foundations for balance. Eng­
land, the United States, and even Latin American 
«classes» had bases for social power: land owner­
ship, control of capital (shareholding or enterprise 
ownership), professional organizations, and some 
history of legitimacy for democracy in place or crys­
tallizing to balance the state. The case of post-social­
ist East Europe and Eurasia involves creating both 
capitalist institutions (e.g. private property) and dem­
ocratic procedures. Coevolution of democracy and 
capitalism is a new historical phenomenon. Contin­
gent political decisions and their institutional out­
comes — and formation of groups, social power, and 
further institutional development — are crucial in our 
rudimentary framework. In initial moments of tran­
sition (or «transformation»), interests and identities 
interact, and contingent events lead to an initial set 
of institutions that structure political power and re­
lations that shape the emergence of organized social 
groups. Particular important are the arrangements of 
state structure and political processes of representa­
tion and thus of control of the state. These emerge 
contingently from initial change in power (transfer 
or breakdown), regime type, and legacies of civil 
society and how these influenced initial political 
choices and institutional arrangements, and how 
these shaped further evolution of political processes 
and structures. 
In this paper we limit out focus to organization­
al and institutional factors: the impact of the form 
and tactical choices during the initial transition; the 
legacies of social organization; and the impact of 
regime type (parliamentary versus presidential). 
Power: Transfer or Disruption 
At the initial moment of change (1989 or 1991), 
a key factor was whether power and political insti­
tutions (especially in state structure) were transferred 
or disrupted. In East Europe, communist elites trans­
ferred power and right of participation to wider bod­
ies (e.g. parliaments), while power of rule was dis­
rupted in the former USSR. A transfer of power in­
volves an exchange of elites at the top of political 
structures, especially the state; but the machinery of 
political structures remains intact. Ministries, police 
and courts, deliberative bodies, and parties continue 
to function, even if reforms are necessary for a dem­
ocratic and capitalist transition. In a breakdown of 
power, political instability results, leading to a scram­
ble to restructure and rebuild political power. In such 
cases, political power often emerges centralized be­
cause of the struggles to rebuild it [16]. In a situa­
tion of instability, where political power and the po­
litical order must be rebuilt, creating a negotiated 
balance is more difficult than conquering it (as hap­
pens in the aftermath of revolutions and civil wars). 
A transfer of power need not lead to democracy, but 
the chances for democracy are higher (unless preex­
isting structures are highly centralized and inimical 
to democracy). 
Regime Type 
Another important factor is whether a system is 
«presidential» or «parliamentary» (locating decision­
making authority in a single individual or a par­
liamentary group and ministers answerable to that 
body). Because parliaments have many people and 
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parties, more interests can be continuously represent­
ed rather than by totally left out of political decision­
making. This can facilitate slower polity-making but 
can also create the incentives to deliberation and 
negotiation, especially if embedded in an organized 
civil society. A state with a strong presidency can 
develop and implement public policy better than a 
parliamentary system, but also risks confrontations 
in transfers of power [17]. Presidential systems lo­
cate power in a single individual, creating an «all-
or-none» logic: the interests of one set of actors sup­
porting the victorious candidate will be represented 
in the halls of power, while the interests of the los­
ers are left out. The risks of loss are thus greater in 
a presidential system. If risks to various actors are 
great in a loss in a presidential system, those actors 
my decide the rational action is to act against democ­
racy, for example siding with military forces or a 
corrupt president out to hold on to power. This risk 
extends beyond the electoral process. Actors who 
base their power on a president will want that pres­
ident to stay in power, and while he is in office they 
will seek to influence him. With a parliament, the 
method for influence is lobbying, but a large number 
of people are involved, leading to deliberation and 
compromise. When a single individual is lobbied, 
competition becomes fierce for that person's grace. 
Hence, political influence and favoritism in a presi­
dential system, where power revolves around a cen­
tral figure and his coterie, takes on the logic of «all-
or-none», upping the stakes of the political game. 
This hinders democracy, as organized interests try to 
influence and undermine elections and the political 
process, leading to corruption and conflict informal 
«clans» form around the president. 
Legacies of Civil Society and Social 
Organization 
It is cliche that democracy requires civil society 
(even if it is not sufficient for democracy). By «ci­
vil society» we mean social spaces beyond control 
of the state — for example, private organizations and 
association, private property, and the like. Civil so­
ciety supports democracy by providing a balance to 
state organization and power; states have to negoti­
ate with business owners to obtain higher taxes, with 
parties to obtain votes and political support, with 
associations to mobilize support for state activities 
(e.g. war). Two aspects of civil society concern us 
here. First, civil society is not sufficient for democ­
racy. Industrialists may side with the state against 
democracy. State institutions may nudge civic organ­
izations towards or away from democracy; as men­
tioned above, a presidential system with its «all-or-
none» logic induces civic organizations (especially 
elite organizations) to orient themselves to presidents 
at the expense of the public deliberation and negoti­
ation so important to democracy, whereas parlia­
ments encourage give-and-take. Thus, civil society 
is necessary for democracy but not sufficient. Sec­
ond, civil society does not emerge spontaneously; 
even if humans are social creatures, the art of asso­
ciation has roots in historical practices and habits 
[18; 19]. Habits of civic association stem from long 
histories of a primordial balance of power: for ex­
ample, «republics» of northern Italy forced to nego­
tiate and interact, or American towns free from aris­
tocratic feudalism, industrial domination, or an over­
powering state. 
This sets out part of the theoretical foundation: 
legacies of civil society and initial institutional de­
cisions structured incentives and structures, that in 
turn shaped how that balance that could encourage 
reciprocity and negotiation — the roots of democra­
cy. How did this work in reality? We now turn to a 
brief empirical discussion of East Europe versus the 
former USSR. All cases demonstrate uniqueness and 
variation but also similarities. By drawing on these 
we highlight some general factors involved. While 
a more thorough empirical discussion would provide 
more flesh, to conserve space we provide a basic 
empirical overview. 
While there was variation in East European 
countries, there were also similarities relative to the 
experience of former Soviet republics. In Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the communist 
elite transferred political power from the Party to the 
state in such a way as to channel social mobilization 
but still maintain some future influence. Democratic 
procedures were set up so that communists would be 
represented in the new, seemingly inevitable demo­
cratic system; but room was left for contenders as 
well. Thus, Poland and Czechoslovakia (before the 
Velvet Divorce) saw political compromises between 
communists and organized reform movements allow­
ing for a transfer of power. The Polish compromise 
between Solidarity and the communist regime guar­
anteed communists some representation but also 
opened up the polity to democratic competition, sup­
porting a negotiated transfer (especially after Soli­
darity's overwhelming victory in the first elections). 
In Hungary, neither communist elite nor reformers 
sought compromise [20] and turned to parliamenta­
ry elections that transferred power to the parliament 
and away from the Party. 
Political change after 1989 was thus a negotiat­
ed transfer of power and domination from the Com­
munist Party to elected representatives in the state. 
States and political institutions did not come crash­
ing down and thus did not have to be rebuilt. This 
was one part of the story. Hungary, the Czech Re­
public, and Poland (with its new constitution) were 
de facto or de jure parliamentary regimes as a result 
of this transfer of power. The initial compromises 
between Party elites and reformers led to power be-
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ing located in a parliament, where both sides be­
lieved they could gain or maintain power. These ne­
gotiated political settlements were institutionalized in 
constitutions creating dejure parliamentary regimes 
(Czech Republic, Hungary) or de facto parliamenta­
ry regimes (Poland), where a supposedly central 
presidential figure is in reality much more powerless 
in the face of ministers and parliament. The result is 
that networks and «embeddedness» between state/ 
regime and society have been less disrupted by the 
«all-or-none» incentives of presidential regimes. 
Transfer of power to a parliament is a founda­
tion, but this was also augmented by a civil society 
that, while nowhere near as organized and institution­
alized as in the democratic West, was in Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary organized enough to 
embed political institutions in webs of networks that 
were a foundation for non-state organization — 
hence balancing off the state — and embed state and 
society within each other, creating the imperative for 
negotiation, deliberation, and accountability more 
apparent in East Europe than in the former USSR 
[21]. These civic roots included various forms of 
economic autonomy — entrepreneurship, an orga­
nized working class or peasantry [22; 23] — as well 
as political organization. Poland had not only Soli­
darity but also minor socialist parties that could act 
as immediate centers for organization. Hungary and 
the Czech Republic did not enjoy such political or­
ganization, but still had organized dissident groups 
and reformist wings within their communist parties 
that could emerge rather than become entangled in 
intra-party politics, as was the case within the Sovi­
et communist party. Further, practices of civic asso­
ciation, often associated with political action, were 
more predominant in East Europe rather than in the 
USSR. Political contention broke out at various 
times — repeatedly in Poland — because of contin­
uing practices of association that were not broken by 
concerted state power [24; 25]. 
If the story of Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary was transfer and balance supporting democ­
racy, the stories in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are 
less sanguine. In Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, po­
litical power was disrupted by the fall of the USSR. 
Republican political bodies found themselves with 
political power but often without sufficient political 
structure to handle new tasks at hand. Political or­
ganization was weak at best except for the Commu­
nist Party [26], except for Ukraine's Rukh. Political 
power and organization, located both in the state and 
polity, had to be created rather than merely trans­
ferred. In Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus the commu­
nist elite could not so easily transfer political power 
to itself as in East Europe because, first, communist 
parties' existence was initially illegal, and second, 
the machinery of republican states had to be aug­
mented to take over the responsibilities of running a 
sovereign state. This allowed the potential for break­
down, best seen in the threats of secession (e.g. var­
ious autonomous republics, including Chechnia, in 
Russia and the Crimea in Ukraine). Further, all three 
countries had stronger parliaments after their initial 
transitions, but presidentialism soon became the 
norm — first in Russia, then in Belarus, and finally 
in Ukraine (which arguably had the strongest parlia­
mentary system of the three). Finally, civil society 
less well organized than in East Europe. Given the 
totalitarian legacy of strong state penetration of so­
ciety (given that the Soviet regime allowed more 
reforms in East Europe as a means of experiment­
ing and observing results), civil society was weakly 
organized [27]. Where it did exist was in the shad­
ows of the «black» and «gray» markets and infor­
mal social networks (especially of closet reformers 
and dissidents). Initially power was transferred to the 
Supreme Soviet and the Russian presidency, but this 
provided the foundation for conflict and political 
confusion. 
This weak underpinning for democracy was ex­
acerbated by continuing political and economic cri­
ses and contingencies over the 1990s. In Russia, 
where power was not simply transferred (as in from 
the USSR to the Russian Federation) but also disrupt­
ed, economic and political change led to continued 
economic crises and constant warfare between 
Yeltsin's executive and Khasbulatov's legislative 
Supreme Soviet. Because of this, Yeltsin strength­
ened the presidential system in the 1993 constitution 
— creating the «all-or-none» incentive mentioned 
earlier. (This depended on contingency, i.e. military 
support for Yeltsin in October 1993.) Clans («oli­
garchs») formed around Yeltsin and his coterie. With 
power centralized in the Kremlin — e.g. Yeltsin's 
decree powers over the economy, especially privati­
zation — organized interests shifted to the byzantine 
halls of the president. «Loans-for-shares» privatization 
(zalogovaia privatizatsiid), a cheap transfer of state-
owned assets to Yeltsin allies, is one example of clans 
politics in action. The 1996 presidential election and 
1999 Duma election, where Yeltsin allies used eco­
nomic muscle and media control to slander Yeltsin's 
opponents (communists, Luzhkov's Otechestvo-Vsia 
Rossiia), are another example. While he may have 
turned against them, Putin owes his rise to power to 
these clans (especially to Boris Berezovskii), who saw 
in him support for the status quo. 
Belarus shows Tocqueville's wisdom [28] that 
the state is augmented and centralized in following 
a revolution, and how the collapse of power and the 
absence of organized civil society can hinder democ­
racy [29]. Initially, Belarus did not have a presiden­
cy. In 1991, in the wake of the failed August coup, 
Stanislav Shushkevich, the deputy speaker of the 
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Supreme Soviet, was named «president of the par­
liament.» After continuing instability, in March 1994 
the Parliament created a presidency and called for 
elections, eventually won by Aleksandr Lukashenko. 
To enhance his powers, Lukashenko created a «pres­
idential vertical line» of personally appointed offi­
cials to oversee regions and districts and to answer 
directly to him rather than the regional electorate. 
Lukashenko's constitution altered the legislature, 
where the Senate (upper house) members became ap­
pointed directly by the President and regional author­
ities (themselves elected or appointed by the presi­
dent); also, 110 members of the lower house were 
delegates from the old Supreme Soviet loyal to Lu­
kashenko. Lukashenko's ambitions were met neither 
by organized political opposition — Belarus' «dem­
ocratic» forces were far from organized, and weak 
economic reform not only prevented the emergence 
of non-state resource control (allowing for state-so­
ciety balance) but also allowed the state to regain 
Soviet-type control over the economy. 
In its uneasy state-building experience [30; 31], 
Ukraine initially had a stronger parliament (the Ver-
hovna Rada) and, because of stronger «national» 
consciousness than in Belarus (where it was not well 
articulated) or Russia (where it was disputed) and the 
basis for socio-political organization in the Rukh 
social movement (which later became a bona fide 
political party). Both Rada and President weakened 
and constrained each other. President Kravchuk fo­
cused early on building the image of the Ukrainian 
nation and building executive power through politi­
cal coalitions. Kravchuk called for Presidential con­
trol over local councils and executives, to give him 
the power to control the country more directly, and 
also called for the creation of a State Council. As a 
result of Kravchuk's political games, parliament's 
conservatism, and the inability of political actors to 
implement economic reforms, the political atmos­
phere polarized. Kravchuk's institution- and coali­
tion-building helped him to remain in power but did 
not prevent confrontations with opponents. Follow­
ing economic deterioration, strikes, and bickering 
between president and parliament, Ukrainians went 
to the polls and elected Leonid Kuchma to the pres­
idency. Kravchuk left office peacefully, offering the 
hope that democracy was on its way in Ukraine. The 
political game changed with a new constitution, ap­
proved in June 1996, which was to strengthen both 
president and parliament but in reality helped the 
presidency [32]. Ostensibly, the reason for increas­
ing presidential power (formally articulated) was to 
increase the efficacy of policy formation and imple­
mentation: with power centralized in the president 
and ministers, there would be less foot-dragging over 
economic reforms. However, this has had a poten­
tially negative effect for democracy. With increased 
presidential strength, the «all-or-none» incentives 
increased, leading to clan formation around President 
Kuchma — and in so doing undercutting democratic 
procedure of policy-making [33]. 
Conclusion 
Type of change in power, regime type, and leg­
acies of civil society are not simply important by 
themselves but by how they are linked. How power 
changes — by transfer or breakdown followed by 
state-building — influences regime type. The great­
er the political instability (resulting from break­
down), the greater the possibility that a parliamen­
tary regime will give way to elite clans and presi-
dentialism. A transfer of power appears to favor a 
parliamentary regime that can survive. Yet regime 
type is not enough for democracy: Ukraine had a de 
facto parliamentary regime that did not survive the 
multiple impacts of weak civil society, crises, and 
power-building. Legacies of civil society help main­
tain parliamentary systems and democracy because 
they help balance power between state and society, 
preventing predatory behavior (by state or elites), 
fostering policies that have a chance of working, and 
finding broad social support. In Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, regime type emerged from 
early political choices and interacted with civic as­
sociation. Communist elites chose a transfer of power 
to secure a place in the post-socialist regime. The 
combination of parliamentary systems and networks 
of civil society facilitated institutionalized negotia­
tion and accountability through «deliberative asso­
ciation» [34]. In those countries where power broke 
down (and civil society was weak), state elites, es­
pecially presidents, could augment power, creating 
a presidential system with its obstacles to democrat­
ic consolidation. Further shocks and crises only en­
hanced political centralization. 
The outcome of initial decisions — whether 
power was transferred or disrupted, presidential-ver-
sus-parliamentary system — can be noticed in the 
rise of «clans» and degree of centralization or bal­
ance in political power. Poland and the Czech Re­
public both have a weak presidency and a strong 
parliament; actors are bound in «deliberative asso­
ciations» embedding state and society and creating 
the foundations for cooperation and deliberation rath­
er than conflict and dictation. No surprise: power was 
transferred into parliamentary systems, and a proto-
civil society was bequeathed by the past. Following 
breakdown of power, instability, weak civil society, 
and continuing crises, power was centralized in pres­
idencies in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, creating the 
«all-or-none» logic facilitating clans and anti-dem­
ocratic politics including media abuse, police tactics, 
and assassinations in the attempt to maintain control 
of that seat of power and its rewards for that indi­
vidual and his allies. 
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Contingent events played a role. Yeltsin argued 
that a strong presidency was necessary to implement 
economic reforms. The 1993 constitution followed 
confrontations between Yeltsin and the Supreme 
Soviet that Yeltsin's camp claimed stemmed from 
communist obstructionism. The same scenario was 
played out in Belarus and Ukraine: Lukashenko 
campaigning against crime and corruption and call­
ing for a strong presidency to deal with constant cri­
ses; Kuchma calling for a stronger presidency to deal 
with economic decline. That a strong executive deals 
better with economic reform is problematic [35]; but 
still this was used to justify augmenting presidential 
power rather than deliberative bodies and institu­
tions. The «strong hand» beat «deliberation» not 
because of crises per se, but because of how crises 
were «framed» in political discourse. (Framing and 
discourse are central to the story of political and eco­
nomic change, but space does not permit developing 
this aspect of our framework in our present article.) 
If crises in Russia or Ukraine led to stronger execu­
tives, crises in East Europe did not, given that politi­
cal institutions were embedded in organization and 
networks developed under the parliamentary regime 
[36]. Crises by themselves did not create stronger pres­
idencies: crises amplified opportunity and justification 
to augment presidential power. 
In short, the two paths to political change and 
democratization in East Europe and in the former 
USSR are outlined thus: 
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While considerations of space prevent more de­
tailed data and theory (forthcoming in our future work), 
this brief outline and discussion suggest a means to 
analyze the emergence, consolidation, and development 
of democracy. Our rudimentary conclusions are: 
• Transfer of power is better for democracy than 
power disruption, because the latter risks centralized 
power around a president; 
• Parliamentary systems, if inefficient in imple­
menting policy, encourage deliberation, negotiation, 
and pro-democratic practices, while the «all-or-none» 
logic of a presidency risks an­
tidemocratic practices; 
• Forms of political 
change, regime type, and ci­
vic association are not creat­
ed outright but are accidental 
and contingent. 
These may not be hoped-
for implications for the opti­
mistic reformers, but they do 
point out the realities of which 
reformers — and hopeful cit­
izens — must be aware. De­
mocracy is worth the struggle, 
but to get to sweet waters we 
must pass through the bitter. 
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